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 A new first-order decision-making model for the 
procurement of public sector infrastructure: 
Procedures and Testing 
Poh Lian Teo1, Adrian J. Bridge2 and Jason Gray3  
Given global demand for new infrastructure, governments face substantial challenges in 
funding new infrastructure and delivering Value for Money (VfM). As part of the background 
to this challenge, a critique is given of current practice in the selection of the approach to 
procure major public sector infrastructure in Australia and which is akin to the Multi-Attribute 
Utility Approach (MAUA). To contribute towards addressing the key weaknesses of MAUA, a 
new first-order procurement decision-making model is presented. The model addresses the 
make-or-buy decision (risk allocation); the bundling decision (property rights incentives), as 
well as the exchange relationship decision (relational to arms-length exchange) in its novel 
approach to articulating a procurement strategy designed to yield superior VfM across the 
whole life of the asset. The aim of this paper is report on the development of this decision-
making model in terms of the procedural tasks to be followed and the method being used to 
test the model. The planned approach to testing the model uses a sample of 87 Australian 
major infrastructure projects in the sum of AUD32 billion and deploys a key proxy for VfM 
comprising expressions of interest, as an indicator of competition. 
Keywords: decision-making model, infrastructure, procurement, value-for-money 
1. Introduction 
1.1 VfM challenge and weaknesses in MAUA approach to procurement 
The global demand for infrastructure is increasing dramatically and governments are facing 
substantial challenges to fund public infrastructure and achieve value-for-money (VfM). 
OECD (2006) estimated USD3 trillion is required globally 2007-30 and in Australia there is 
an estimated pipeline of infrastructure projects amounting to more than AUD 770 billion 
(Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 2010). As such, leveraging private finance through 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) is considered to be a key mode of delivering new 
infrastructure in many countries (KPMG 2010). However, recent concerns have been raised 
in UK regarding uncertainties of PPP delivering VfM and criteria for early identification of 
projects suitable for PPP (House of Lords 2010). At the same time, PPPs have become 
largely a business as usual consideration in Australia, comprising separate contracts of 
design and construct; and operations and maintenance (Infrastructure Australia 2012). 
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 Procurement options analysis (POA) in the National PPP Policy Framework in Australia 
provides an approach for selecting a suitable procurement mode including PPP, and tends 
toward using semi-quantitative measures (use of rankings/perceptual scales and non-
monetary) of costs/benefits of alternative procurement modes. In other words, client 
requirements (project outcomes) are systematically matched with the relative merits of 
alternative procurement modes in order to select the preferred procurement mode. This 
approach is also known as the Multi-Attribute Utility Approach (MAUA). MAUA is supported 
by a large body of work with around 900 studies related to MAUA and procurement systems, 
and has been regarded as “the foremost technique and approach for examining the criteria 
of clients and the preferences of experts’ weights for each method in the most objective way” 
(Love et al. 1998). However, MAUA has inherent problems of implementation, that is, a lack 
of generally agreed and accepted set of criteria among the experts and difficulty in reaching 
consensus in the set of utility scores for each procurement method (Skitmore and Marsden 
1988; and Love et al. 1998). Additionally, the range of procurement methods in research 
may not be comprehensive; the scores produced may differ by narrow margins which results 
in limited differentiation and less reliable selection; and the analyses may be carried out on 
limited range of trial projects (Sweeney 2009). These issues arise from MAUA’s fundamental 
weakness associated with its tautological nature. That is, matching project outcomes with 
the relative merits of alternative procurement modes to select the preferred procurement 
mode (Chang and Ive 2002; Teo, Bridge and Jefferies 2010). The preferred procurement 
mode is defined as a subset, or effectively in the same terms, as the desired outcomes of 
the project and is therefore tautological, that is, the relationship is circular and considered a 
truism that is not falsifiable (Popper 1959). In summary, MAUA lacks scientific maturity and 
can be decoupled from the risk management plan given a justifiable rationale and which may 
not be economic. The top three boxes in Figure 1 indicate the direction of the current 
approach where procurement selection is based on matching project outcomes with 
alternative procurement modes (right to left). In other words, rather than deriving the 
procurement mode from project attributes (bottom three boxes left to right), other factors 
such as time is driving the selection of the procurement mode. Hence, the current approach 
is susceptible to non-economic influences and undermines risk analysis being carried out. 
This creates a narrow approach to VfM, where VfM is determined by whether or not the 
selected procurement mode delivers the key performance outcome. Furthermore, the current 
procurement approach also requires risk analysis to be carried out at early stages of the 
project where information is lacking, and requires guessing the nature and extent of potential 
risk events occurring, and subsequently second guessing the value and extent of these 
risks.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 New model versus current approach 
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 Hence from the above critique of MAUA, current research and practice appears to lack a 
sound basis to procure VfM across whole-of-life of the asset, and research in the 
construction literature is only beginning to show some signs that the dominant and Nobel 
prize winning theory from the New Institutional Economics field, that is, Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) and the dominant strategic management theory, that is, Resource-Based 
Theory (RBT), are being deployed in construction related sectors, for example, Chang and 
Ive (2002), Bridge and Tisdell (2004), Jin and Doloi (2008) and Sweeney (2009). 
1.2 Compensating virtues of new first-order decision-making model 
Given the weaknesses of MAUA, a new first-order procurement decision-making model 
(shown in Figure 2) has been developed and described elsewhere (Teo, Bridge, Gray and 
Rowlinson 2012; Teo, Bridge, Gray and Jefferies 2011; Teo, Bridge and Jefferies 2010). The 
new model deploys both TCE and RBT, to measure the technological and physical attributes 
of the project, as well as the relative capabilities and competencies of government versus 
the private sector with respect to the project, to identify a procurement strategy that is more 
likely to deliver a better ratio of production benefits to production costs and transaction costs 
across the whole-of-life of the asset, than procurement modes associated with the outcome 
of deploying MAUA. The key departure of the new model from MAUA is the model’s analysis 
of make-or-buy decisions within the project at the individual activity level. That is, the focus is 
on production activities of design, construct, operations and maintenance of a first-order 
level, and not the organisation or management across activities which are considered 
second-order level. The project is divided into key activities. With knowledge of the key 
activities, the model measures the relative technical and/or organisational capabilities and 
competence of each activity across government and private sector, in terms of who is better 
placed to manage the activity. As such, the new model avoids issues arising from 
information gaps surrounding the new project during its early stages, and indirectly performs 
risk allocation at the activity level without having to guess with information missing at 
schematic stages and later second guessing when the buyer, for example, government or its 
agents, attempt to assess the nature and value of risks which are better understood by 
suppliers. In other words, the new model is more reliable and an appropriate level of analysis 
in terms of accessing who is better at dealing with inherent risks that might occur within the 
activity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Schematic of new first-order procurement decision-making model 
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 The model also provides a direct and clear connection between data gathering, including risk 
analysis, and the approach to procuring the project. As such, the procurement strategy is 
informed based on economical factors and not influenced by political goals, hence more 
likely to deliver superior VfM, or a better ratio of production benefits to production costs and 
transaction costs across the whole-of-life of the asset, than procurement modes associated 
with deploying MAUA. The paper aims to provide a step-by-step description of the new 
model and the approach of testing using competition as a dependent variable. 
2. Procedures 
2.1 Stage 1 Task A Activity analysis 
The main purpose of Task A is to identify key first-order activities in the project. The 
distinction between key activities lies in the discrete technological boundaries, distinct 
knowledge base or skill sets, associated with design; construction; operations and 
maintenance (D,C,O,M) as the dominant source of adding value. Table 1 illustrates key 
activities of a typical road project. The key activity should be non-trivial in terms of significant 
cost relative to the capital cost of the project. The following are not a key activity: a milestone 
on the program, such as schematic design which covers many consultant disciplines; a 
building element which covers many trades; and organisational and/or management activity 
which includes planning/programming and supply chain management including procurement, 
as the main source of adding value. The scope of activity analysis is delimited to activities 
starting from and including schematic design (hence excludes upstream activities like 
planning and surveying site); to and including maintenance of built asset and operation to 
but excluding core/front-line activities (hence excludes downstream activities, such as 
clinical services in hospitals). This approach starts with focus on key production activities of 
D,C,O,M and is therefore first-order analysis, unlike current practice that starts at an 
organisational or second-order level, say managing contractor. Corresponding to the critique 
of inappropriate risk analysis, this approach avoids being too focused on individual risks and 
does not require guessing and second guessing of risks with information gaps. Furthermore, 
it provides a transparent framework based on economic principles, unlike MAUA where risk 
analysis can be overshadowed by the main concern of matching key opening day outcomes 
to procurement mode.  
Design Construction Operations Maintenance 
Design of construction 
1. Road civil engineering 
design 
2. Traffic engineering design 
Design of performance 
specification of maintenance 
3. Plan for routine 
maintenance, 
programmed maintenance 
and rehabilitation of road 
pavement, road furniture, 
drainage maintenance & 
ITS  
4. Earthworks 
5. Traffic management 
6. Drainage and culverts 
7. Retaining walls 
8. Plant-mixed stabilised pavements 
9. Sprayed bituminous surfacing and cover 
aggregate 
10. Asphalt, including preparation, surfacing 
and grading 
11. Roadside structures  
12. Noise barrier 
13. Line markings; markers 
14. Electrical pits, conduits, fittings, including 
road lightings, ITS ducts and pits 
15. Landscaping 
16. Intelligent 
Transport Systems 
and traffic 
operations 
17. Inspections & data 
collection, including 
reactive and 
programmed 
maintenance 
18. Reactive maintenance  
19. Rehabilitation 
Table 1: List of typical key activities in a road project 
 2.2 Stage 1 Task B Make-or-buy analysis (on each activity) 
This task involves measuring TCE and RBT attributes using a questionnaire instrument and 
then assigning an activity level for each key activity. The conventional approach in TCE 
views transaction costs which occurs across technological boundaries as the unit of 
analysis, and is mediated by governance structures (markets, hybrids and hierarchies) which 
lends itself to make-or-buy analysis (Chang 2013). Correspondingly, the first-order approach 
also leads into a make-or-buy analysis around the key activities/ transactions in Stage 1 
Task B and which is effectively risk analysis using an indirect approach, by deploying RBT 
and TCE. RBT deals with technical/production risks, that is who is better at the key activity, 
either technologically or organizationally, and therefore better able to manage risks arising 
out of the key activity. TCE deals with external exchange risks arising out of hold-up as 
function of specific investment by one party to the key activity that creates a dependency of 
this party on the other party and which makes the less vulnerable party more powerful and 
able to behave in negative opportunistic ways on the occurrence of a change/variation. For 
example, changes in technology (high asset specificity), and demand and demographic 
changes (uncertainty beyond control), resulting in variations which causes potential for hold-
up. Hence asset specificity and uncertainty are the more influential TCE variables in 
determining the possibility of hold-up in a key activity. Specifically, RBT measurements are 
concerned with relative capability and competence of government versus private sector and 
TCE deals with physical, technological or human asset attributes and addresses the issue of 
potential hold-up to the government by private sector. From applying the measurements, a 
pattern for each activity is matched with the closest theoretical/predicted pattern shown in 
Table 2. In doing so, the activity is suggested as internalised or externalised to achieve 
greatest efficiency, including the most efficient allocation of risks. Activities are internalised 
when the government uses its own resources to carry out the activity or when it owns more 
than fifty percent of the subsidiary firm, and externalised when contracted out to an external 
firm by the government directly or subsidiary indirectly. This approach of identifying the party 
best able to manage risks associated with an activity is a significant departure from current 
practice. Instead of identifying and assessing risks at the early stages of the project where 
information is missing, the emphasis is on resources owned by government versus private 
sector relative to each project activity. Hence, this approach is able to more reliably 
anticipate which party is better at managing the risks associated with each activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Integrative framework of vertical integration (from Bridge and Tisdell 2004; 
Bridge 2008) 
 2.3 Stage 1 Task C Market analysis 
From here on, the focus is the procurement of externalized activities. SCP analysis is used 
to corroborate the levels of activities identified, and consider any Level 7 activities arising out 
of large scale of this activity’s work. If any of these activities are found, the model suggests 
attempting to break down into two or more smaller/sub-activities to reach the next tier of 
firms specialising in these activities. This avoids lack of competition due to size or possibly 
more powerful sub-market firm (for example, subcontractor) as part of supply chain by main-
market firm (main contractor). 
2.4 Stage 2 Task A Bundling analysis 
The model then considers any potential troublesome activities that will lead to government 
becoming dependent/vulnerable and market firms becoming more powerful, that is, Level 4b 
activities that can potentially cause hold-up ex post arising out of high asset specificity and 
high uncertainty, or any residual Level 7 activities that cannot be further broken down 
because of physical/proximity issues or Level 7 activities arising out of rare technology 
leading to a lack of competition, and market power to set prices ex ante/pre-contract and 
which again can cause hold-up problems ex post/post-contract. Next, the model determines 
if any of the potential opportunistic behaviour by market firms associated in these 
troublesome activities be checked by the firm engaged at the head of supply that includes 
these activities, for example main contractor at the head of the supply chain that is 
coordinating/subcontracting these troublesome activities using threat of future work to 
attenuate any potential negative opportunistic behaviour. If not, then considering either 1) a 
special relationship with the firms providing these troublesome activities through the firm 
being engaged at the head of the supply chain that includes these troublesome activities (for 
example, use of PC Sum and a nominated subcontractor/supplier arrangement) which then 
drops down into an exchange relationship consideration; or 2) a separate contract between 
the firm/government and the firm providing the troublesome activity, that is, excluding the 
troublesome activities from any subsequent bundle. 
This task refers to Property rights theory whereby creating greater ownership, such as 
bundling operations and/or maintenance (O&/M) together with design and construct 
contracts (D&C), the firm is likely to invest more to gain greater returns in investments in the 
long term. Conversely, less bundling means lower incentives to provide better quality or 
design. By bundling O&/M into the contract, such as DCM, DCOM or PPP, there is greater 
ownership which makes the contractor responsible for operations & maintenance of the 
asset, and so greater likelihood of investments in production and non-production related 
investments. In addition, Hart (2003) indicated that if a service delivery provision is not 
clearly specified, contractor has the flexibility to modify the nature/quality of the facility 
without violating the contract. In contrast, in D&C, the contractor does not internalise any 
operating costs and there is little incentive for investment, where they perform minimum 
production and non-production related investment. If there is a lack of specification of 
production quality and more focus on the service provision, contractors may have the 
flexibility to choose lower productive investments, that is providing a cheaper and lower 
quality solution for the client. Hence, property rights do not favour D&C contracts and where 
 contracts that cannot be specified clearly, favours conventional provision (or unbundling), for 
example, construct only instead of PPP (Hart 2003).  
The next step is to bundle remaining key activities into main activities of D,C,O,M, and 
undertake second-order analysis (assess the activities of organizing/managing each of these 
main activities, such as, main contractor on construction). And similarly break down each 
activity if size and/or complexity of main activity leads to Level 7 (again, leading to lack of 
competition and market power to set prices ex ante and hold-up problems ex post). Next, the 
model identifies any potential viable major activities, that is, bundle(s) of either DCO main 
activities or DCM main activities or DCOM main activities as PPP(s), or otherwise via 
contract(s) and remainder as separate D/C/O&M main activities with each main activity 
organized by government (either directly and/or using market firm, such as, PM/consultant). 
In sum, there are three levels of activities; namely 1) key activities (about highest level of 
market specialization); 2) main activities (set of D or C or O or M key activities); and 3) major 
activities (set of DCO or DCM or DCOM main activities). Organisation and management of 
activities includes, planning and coordination of timing of tasks within activities; and across 
key activities in main activities; and across main activities in major activities.  
2.5 Stage 2 Task B Exchange relationship analysis 
This task involves re-measuring TCE variables at the exchange between government and 
the market firm that can provide each major activity (bundle) and/or each main activity and/or 
each key activity to determine the most efficient exchange ranging from 1) efficient relational 
exchange, such as, Alliancing or pain/gain share regime to 2) efficient discrete exchange 
(such as, arms-length exchange, or standard neo-classical contracting such as, lump-
sum/fixed-price contracts with mechanisms to resolve dispute by third parties and 3) short-
term inefficient discrete exchange, such as, non-standard contracts written with bespoke 
credible threats for non-performance (See Figure 3 for summary). This measurement now 
includes the task of planning and coordination across key activities and so this measure of 
main and major activities may produce a different result on the TCE variables than that 
recorded across the TCE results measured in the constituent key activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Exchange relationship analysis (Bridge 2008) 
In Box 1, activities have a very high potential for hold-up due to high asset specificity and 
high uncertainty, that is Level 4b, and government can more efficiently seek to control these 
activities using more relational exchange, such as collaborative approaches or share risks in 
an alliance fashion. Main or major activities dominated by Level 5 and 6 activities are 
 reflected in Box 2 which can yield an efficient transfer of risk and control to the contractor. 
Standard neo-classical contracts can be deployed to obtain a fixed price for construct only 
and/or DC and/or DCOM package. If DCOM with private finance is being used in Pattern 5 
and 6 activities, then a conventional PPP arrangement is appropriate. Box 3 reflects 
activities with a very high potential for hold-up (Level 7), but unlike Level 4b, government 
lacks in-house capability and access to agents to effectively collaborate with the contractor 
in terms of D,C,O,M. In transferring control to the contractor, government can seek 
assurances through writing contracts with credible threats concerning compliance with 
contracted performance, and hence a very arms-length and discrete exchange with the 
contractor/consortium. 
3. Approach to testing the new first-order decision-making model  
3.1 Developing competition as a dependent variable/proxy for VfM 
The preferred method of demonstrating VfM is through estimation of costs and benefits 
associated with alternative procurement modes of a project over the whole life of the asset. 
However, a lack of quantitative and comparable data in operations and maintenance creates 
difficulties in measuring VfM using an absolute monetary value. In cases where the concept 
is not able to be measured directly, Remler and Van Ryzin (2011) recommended developing 
a proxy, that is a “measure that substitutes for another unavailable measure”. Competition 
has been widely recognised and accepted to be the determinant of value. Surveys regarding 
critical success factors for PPP have been conducted in many countries, including Australia, 
United Kingdom and Hongkong; and results have identified competition as one of the key 
VfM drivers (Andersen 2000; Cheung et al. 2009; Dixon et al. 2005). In economic terms, 
competition drives down marginal costs and creates downward pressure on prices. Not only 
does absolute level of competitive tension create downward pressure on prices but it also 
facilitates the crystallisation of innovations in the design that impinges on time, cost and 
quality and which will influence the overall performance of the project across its life-cycle. 
Studies have shown empirically that greater number of bidders have the effect of reducing 
value of lowest bid (McCaffer 1979; Skitmore 2002; Domberger and Rimmer 1994). Auction 
theory scholars have empirically demonstrated that in a sealed tender auction, perfect or 
intense competition leads to convergence of the true value of the object even when bidders 
have incomplete information about the value (Brannman et al. 1987). Gupta (2002) 
examined 1,937 highway construction projects over five year period, and results show that 
absolute level of competition creates downward pressure on price, that is the value of 
winning bids decreases as number of bidder increases and the effect on value becomes 
insignificant when the absolute number of bidders reaches a maximum, that is, competitive 
threshold. Gupta derived competitive threshold to be 6-8 bidders in an open tender, subject 
to factors, such as size of project and market conditions. Gupta (2002) made the important 
contribution of an optimal level of competition that is dependent on size and bundling of the 
project and market at the time of tender. 
For the purposes of this study, actual competition is measured by the attractiveness of the 
project using the number of firms demonstrating their willingness to bid either through open 
tendering (OT) or Expressions of Interest (EoI). This avoids measuring competition based on 
 selective tendering, which does not reflect the level of interest in the market. The next 
section discusses competition and market failure before or ex ante and after or ex post a 
transaction/contract, and how the model is able to address potential market failure. 
3.2 Market failure ex ante  
In neoclassical economics, one major driver for market failure is lack of competition, 
resulting an inequilibrium in allocation of goods and services or Pareto inefficiency in a free 
market. In TCE terms, transaction costs in general impede the formation of the market 
(Arrow 1969). For example, in a monopoly or duopoly where there are only one or two 
competitors in the market, market equilibrium will not be considered Pareto efficient and 
indicates the potential for market failure due to a lack of competition or imperfect 
competition. There is lack of incentives for contractors to be innovative in order to be price 
competitive, and that can impinge on performance across the whole life cycle. The new 
model deals with lack of competition by dividing up the project/activity into bundles of 
activities mindful of the market or supply. For example, empirical results show limited 
numbers of contractors capable of AUD800 million and above in Australian major 
infrastructure market (Teo, Bridge, Gray and Rowlinson 2012).  
3.3 Market failure ex post 
A study of major infrastructure market in Australia shows that current contracting practice 
may have resulted in market failure ex post (Sweeney 2009). Market failure is not an 
absolute theory (Arrow 1969), and in addition to lack of competition, TCE envisages market 
failure occurring ex post due to post-contractual opportunistic behaviour. Opportunistic 
behaviour is not uncommon in the construction industry especially for complex projects 
associated with high uncertainty, and the market may perceive the project to be lucrative in 
terms of a potential for variation claims, and the opportunity to make superior profits post 
contract. Sweeney (2009) examined the Australian market and observed that contractors 
may use low bid tendering strategies to win contracts in an extremely competitive market 
(that is high EoI), and adopt a claim strategy resulting in high variation claims ex post. The 
new model deals with opportunistic behaviour in transactions susceptible to changes, when 
the environment is too complex or uncertain to be fully specified (Level 4 activity), or when 
the market is limited to a small number of players (Level 7 activity). Main contractors/ 
subcontractors can hold-up clients/main contractor, when the activity is on the critical path 
and susceptible to time and cost delays. In summary, as high EoI (over 6-8 EoI) have been 
shown to yield little production benefits in terms of lower prices and lower incentives for 
design innovations and at same time may indicate the prospect of ex post market failure, 
then 6-8 is derived as an optimal level of competition and consistent with VfM for purposes 
of this study. 
3.4 Testing new first-order decision-making model 
The new first-order decision-making model is tested using competition as the dependent 
variable as illustrated in Figure 3, and the corresponding hypothesis is given as: 
 • In cases in which actual procurement matches the theoretical procurement (informed 
by new first-order decision-making model), then actual competition is expected to be 
closer to optimum competition (6 to 8 EoI), than in cases of an appreciable mismatch 
between actual procurement and theoretical procurement. 
Data has been collected on actual procurement (Box A), actual competition (Box D) in both 
road and health projects in Australia via questionnaire survey of government road and health 
departments; and also optimum competition (Box C) via nationwide contractor survey. Based 
on results Box A and Box D (a representative sample of 87 road and health projects worth 
AUD32 billion), Teo, Bridge, Gray and Rowlinson (2012) has already shown the general 
relationship between procurement and competition. That is, a significant relationship 
between EoI and size/value, bundling and payment terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Procurement-tendering-competition hypothesis 
In the final step of testing the hypothesis, case studies are selected from the sample of 87 
projects. Multiple case studies are preferred as this approach can test theory in different 
sectors and attest reliability in different projects. If two or more cases have been shown to 
support the theory, then replication has been achieved. Based on theoretical replication and 
the spread of EoI in the sample (largely low levels of EOIs to around optimum levels), an 
approach is taken in which low/high EoI and optimum EoI are replicated, and based on literal 
replication, the same results will be duplicated, that is low/high EoI and optimum EoI are 
repeated for road and health sectors. The case study design is illustrated in the 2x2 matrix in 
Figure 4. The model is expected to predict a different procurement approach from practice at 
low/high level EoI and similar procurement approach at optimum level EoI.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Multiple case studies replication design 
4. Conclusion 
In summary, the new first-order procurement decision-making model addresses the 
weaknesses of MAUA and provides a more reliable method of risk allocation which is based 
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 on Nobel Prize winning economic theory. The new procurement model is not predisposed to 
any particular procurement mode, and identifies an efficient procurement approach, 
including size, bundling, and exchange relationship (including payment terms); by deploying 
TCE and RBT at a first-order level of the project. The model may uncover projects/bundles 
of activities within projects that may be investigated as potential PPP, and able to cope with 
changing market conditions and resources of government relative to private sector at the 
time of project and in any location.  
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